Parkway Rest Stop » Fort Holabird or the Twilight Zone? The trip from Fort Dix to Baltimore lasted approximately three hours. It had occurred to me that it was the first time in eight weeks that I actually was sitting in a relatively comfortable seat. In basic training, there are virtually no chairs. True, one sits in training rooms and in the mess hall, but those chairs are built for function, not for comfort. Sitting on a bunk is just not the same as sitting in a real chair. I wonder if today I would find a seat on Greyhound bus quite as wonderful as it seemed then.

More importantly, however, the trip meant three hours alone – away from other soldiers and drill sergeants for the first time in more than eight weeks. It had been easy to forget that the world did not stop at the Fort Dix gates, but rather it was humming along quite nicely. The tiny island of civilian life on the Greyhound bus gave me three hours to stare out the window and think about the past eight weeks, about my life prior to those eight weeks, and how strange it seemed that things I had nothing to do with and had no control over placed me on this bus headed south to some damned place no one seemed to know anything about. Once in Baltimore, I dragged my jam- packed duffel bag off the bus, and asked a few people where I could catch the bus to Fort Holabird. One person said, “I heard of Fort Meade, but I really don’t know anything about Fort Holabird.

Are you sure you don’t mean Fort Meade?” A couple other people were equally as ignorant about Fort Holabird. I thought Christ, these people live here, and they never heard of the place? What the hell…???

Finally, I asked the information person at the bus terminal, who mercifully knew what bus I should take to get to this mystery military post. Shortly thereafter, duffel bag and I boarded the local bus that would take us to the base. I asked the bus driver to let me know when we got to Fort Holabird.

No problem,” he said. I was more than a little relieved to confirm that I was on the right bus and that the driver actually knew where the damned place was. The uniform again provoked stares, smiles and glares from the other passengers. By this time, I was becoming accustomed to it.

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Besides, I was tired, and I just wanted to get to wherever the hell I was supposed to be.“Here’s the base, son,” the driver said, as he stopped the bus by the gate, in front of a guardhouse. I struggled with the duffle bag down the bus aisle and thanked the driver as I turned to step off through the bus doors. As I got off the bus, I was horrified to see an MP (military policeman) looking at me and walking at a brisk pace from the guardhouse in my direction.

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Oh hell. Here it comes. He was a tall, staff sergeant, the same rank as my drill sergeant.

I didn’t think it possible, but the MP looked even more frightening than the drill sergeants I had just spent eight weeks with. He was wearing the white MP helmet and a black MP armband.

His trousers were bloused over his spit- shined airborne boots, and he wore a 4. I braced myself for what I was certain would be a ration of shit about something or other I was not doing right.

Before I could say that I was reporting for duty (that’s what one is supposed to say), he said, “Hi. You need help with that bag?”I said, “Pardon me?” What did he say?? He repeated, “How ya doing? You look like you could use some help with that bag.”I was speechless. I could only nod my head in the affirmative, something that would have unleashed a torrent of invective from a drill sergeant about the importance of “sounding off like you got a pair!”The MP looked at me for a moment, and I thought, OK, let the hollering begin. He didn’t holler; He said, “You look beat,” and he effortlessly tossed my duffel bag over his shoulder and carried it to the guardhouse. He set it down and asked, “Where on the base are you headed?” Still in shock, I told him that I had no idea where I was headed.

I just knew that I was ordered to come here. He smiled – he actually smiled – and said, “No problem. Let me take a look at your orders.”He took a quick look at the orders and said, “O. K. The building you have to report to is about a quarter mile down this street on the right side – big brick building – you can’t miss it.

When you get there, ask for Sergeant Perez. He’ll get you squared away.” I thanked him and began walk in the direction he had indicated. The MP shouted behind me, “Wait!” I thought, OK, I knew that this was too good to be true – this must be some kind of trap.

Now, the hollering will begin. I turned in his direction and said, “Yes?” He said, “It’s really too far for you to walk with that bag. I’ll have someone drive you.” OK, Jimbo, this must be some kind of a Twilight- friggin’- Zone thing. There is no way that white- helmeted, bloused- trousered, pistol packin’staff sergeant MP just said that he would get me a ride because it was too far for me to walk with a heavy bag. But, that’s what he said.

The MP got on the phone, and in a minute or two a corporal appeared in an Army car and said, “You the guy who needs a ride? Hop in.”. During the short ride to my destination, I couldn’t think of anything to say to the corporal, other than to thank him for the lift. Here’s the barracks building” he said. Sergeant Perez should be in the orderly room. He’ll check you in.”I found the orderly room, and, just as promised, Sergeant Perez was there. He was a sergeant- first class (three stripes up and two rockers).

Again, I found myself thinking that it was absolutely impossible for a sergeant- first- class to be anything other than mean and ornery. When I entered the room, breathless from having lugged the bag up the stairs, Sergeant Perez looked up from the papers on his desk, and said, “Yes?

What can I do for you?” Wait a minute. This is the way civilized people speak. Sergeants don’t talk this way. What in Christ’s name is going on here?“I’m reporting for duty, sergeant.”“Oh, you must be one of the new students. You’re a little early, but that is not a problem.” Did he say “students?”I could no longer contain myself.

I blurted out, “What is this place?”“You don’t know?” the sergeant said.“No I don’t, and I have not been able to find anyone who knows anything about this place.”“This is the United States Army Military Intelligence School.”I stood there in silence trying to process it all. After a few seconds, I asked, “What will I be doing here?”“Let’s take a look at your orders, and we’ll see.” I handed him my orders, and he said, “You are a 9. C. You’re an interrogator.”“An interrogator?” He remained patient, despite my stupidly repeating everything I had just heard.“Yes, that’s what a 9. C is. I also see that you speak German.”“Well, I took the German test. How can you tell from looking at the orders that I speak German?”The sergeant explained, “It says that your MOS (military occupation specialty) is 9. C2. L2. 9. The “9. C” tells me that you are an interrogator, and the “2.

L2. 9” tells me that you speak German.” I couldn’t help thinking back to that miserable bastard at Fort Dix who tried to intimidate me into not taking the German test. The sergeant, still looking at my orders, continued, “Oh, now I know why you might be a little puzzled by all this.

I see that you are a draftee. We don’t get many draftees. Most guys enlist in order to get into Military Intelligence and they know in advance what it is all about.” “Well, it’s close to the end of the work day here, so let me get you some bedding and show you to the barracks.” Hold it. A sergeant- first- class is going to get my bedding and show me to the barracks?

People in hotels show you to your room. People in the Army don’t show you to your room. Twilight Zone….

Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 1. Gulf War. E- mail This Article. Tag This Article (del. Print (. pdf format). Translate  Carl Conetta.

Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph # 8. October 2. 00. 3Appendix 2: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant. Fatalities in the 1. Gulf War. We accept 3,6.

Iraqi. civilians killed in the 1. Gulf War. Regarding military personnel, we. The estimate for civilian deaths is based on a study conducted by Beth.

Osborne Daponte, a former Census Bureau analyst and currently a senior. Carnegie Mellon University (Daponte 1. With regard. to civilian casualties directly attributable to the war, the study builds. Humans Rights Watch shortly after the. HRW 1. 99. 1). The HRW estimate of 2,5. Iraqi civilians killed.

From this source Daponte compiled a. Subsequently. she checked this on a province by province basis against the official Iraqi. Overall it appeared that. Iraqi government had undercounted the civilian death toll, although.

In some governorates (provinces), the official. Daponte added the "excess" cases. The combined total was 3,6.

Turning to Iraqi military casualties in the 1. Gulf War: we conclude. These resolve into several. Estimates for the casualties imposed by coalition air power on Iraqi. Iraqi officers, which found average unit losses of 2. Aspin and. Dickinson 1.

Keaney and Eliot Cohen 1. Gordon and Trainor 1. Using 3. 60,0. 00 as a baseline for the number of Iraqi troops.

Iraqi field troops. Aspin/Dickinson. report suggests). Apart from field units, however, air power also struck at numerous other. Iraq, and command and control facilities. All told, more than. Almost one- third of these targets were airfields and these absorbed. Also. numerous were small air defense installations.

How many casualties this. Attacks on airfields, per se. Return. visits to sites already bombed may have produced none.

However, the sites. Here, we assume an average number of fatalities per target ranging between. During the war Iraq lost 4. It also lost approximately 6.

We conservatively assume that less than 1. Losses of air. defense personnel and of other air force and navy personnel at bases are. We conclude that between 8,0.

Gulf War Air Power Survey concluded that. Keany. and Cohen, GWAPS, 1. Our estimate of Iraqi casualties in the ground war comprises several.

As many as 2. 50 Iraqis were killed in probing attacks and artillery exchanges. More than 2. 00 were killed in the 2. January - 1 February "Battle of Kafji".

Iraqi brigades). Between 8. Between 8. 00 and 1,0. February "highway of death". Appendix to this report). Rumaila oilfields; and.

USMC and Army XVIII and VII corps (in conjunction. Ground operations conducted between 2. February included 8 substantial. US coalition forces and Iraqi units of battalion- size or. Watch Saw V Megavideo.

Press 2. 00. 1; Biddle 1. Numerous smaller.

With regard to these battles and engagements. Iraqi personnel losses are based on data from several. US Army and independent. Iraqi units engaged, the extent of equipment destruction.

US commanders. and Iraqi POWs recorded in US military historical documents. A careful. and detailed Army reconstruction of the Battle of 7. Easting, for instance. Iraqis had been killed in an engagement between a battalion- sized. US unit and a brigade- sized Iraqi one (Biddle 1. Burns 1. 99. 1). Also.

Iraqi forces were relatively. Some of these. artillery deaths (between 1,0. Among the estimates made above, several may be controversial. Previous. estimates of the numbers killed in the "highway of death" incident(s) outside. Kuwait City range from 2. Our choice of 8. 00- 1. Also controversial are estimates.

Iraqis buried alive by bulldozers of the US 1st. Infantry Division during breeching operations on the first day of the Gulf.

War. Previous estimates range from less than 1. By contrast. we have accepted 2. The higher end estimates for the numbers of Iraqi combatants buried. I know." The commander of the other brigade made different estimates. The division commander, Maj.

Gen. Thomas Rhames, told a press conference that as many as 4. Significantly, none of the officers interviewed seemed especially. However, a captain who ordered part of the. Zmirak 2. 00. 2). A similarly distraught sargent.

Berstein 2. 00. 1). A classified (secret) log made by division officers at the time of the.

Gordon and. Trainor 1. The log also stated that the division.

British division.)Some Iraqis were able to flee the area - - a significant fact in itself. O'Kane 1. 99. 5). One Iraqi who did retreat and witness the bulldozing from. As we will see, the. Iraqi's numerical estimate might actually have reflected the total number. Iraqi troops still alive and present in the area when the assault began.). The Iraqi also claimed that the plows cut down some troops who had exited.

As is made clear in an interview. O'Kane 1. 99. 5). High- end estimates often also make reference to the fact that the authorized. Iraqi unit under attack (the 2.

Infantry Division). Iraqis had surrendered (some from neighboring. However, few if any Iraqi units in the theater actually deployed. The average deployed strength of Iraqi ground units in the theater was. Aspin and Dickinson 1. In some cases. desertions were as high as 5. Those personnel injured by air power comprised as much as 1.

Those Iraqi units in trench lines along the Saudi border were among. At the time of the ground. Iraqi 2. 6th division was judged by CENTCOM to have.

At any rate, on the eve of the. These factors combine to make it unlikely that there were more than.

Iraqi 2. 6th. Division when the breeching operation began. Subsequently, more than 5. Some number. also escaped the area. Also, it would have been unlikely that more than. Others would have been fulfilling vital functions. These considerations support the hypothesis. Some of these Iraqis would have been in fighting shape; others dazed.

Due to. fear of chemical attack and the demanding pace of the planned offensive. US 1st Division did not make loudspeaker appeals for surrender. Low end estimates of the numbers buried alive derive from an Iraqi report.

October 1. 99. 1 (AP, October. Although this number subsequently echoed for years in the US media. PBS 1. 99. 6, Heidenrich 1. Iraqis had. claimed to find more bodies by the end of 1. Xinhua. 1. 99. 1).

Some of these probably came from other sites, however (AP. November 1. 99. 1).

The official Iraqi version today is that "hundreds" were. US 1st Division breeching operation, and. Iraqi docudrama about the event (BBC. AFP 2. 00. 0). Most of the informed estimates of the numbers buried alive during the. Iraqis. However, here. Iraqi claims and better represents a situation that could give.

During the 1. 99. Gulf War, 4. 2 days of coalition air attack on dispersed. Iraqi ground forces produced an average fatality rate of approximately. Iraqi officers (Aspin. Dickenson 1. 99. 2).

The baseline for this rate is 3. Iraqi troops. actually deployed in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations - - and not. Iraqi units, which were significantly understrength.

If desertions during the air war (1. Iraqis exposed to air attack). Much higher rates. One example from the Gulf War is the attack. Iraqi convoys along the "highway of death" at the conflict's end.

Here. we estimate that the personnel under attack suffered at least 6 to 1. Iraqis rode in the. The "highway of death" attacks targeted Iraqi convoys leaving Kuwait. Kuwait City on 2. February 1. 99. 1. Most. newspaper coverage of the incidents cite the number of vehicles that were. Al Jahra. and as many as 4.

Basra. The great majority of. Iraqis. Indeed, only 2. CIA as being. armored vehicles (CIA, 1.

On the coastal road, however, the majority. On the main highway, much of the destruction was concentrated along. Kuwait City to just short of. Iraq border - - a distance of more than 5. Along the coastal.

Although there. were fewer wrecks along the coastal road than along the main, the extent. How many Iraqis died in the attacks remains controversial. One high- end. estimate asserts that "tens of thousands" of Iraqi soldiers were killed. Chediac 1. 99. 1).